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Do Immigrant Integration Policies Matter? A Three-Country Comparison among Turkish Immigrants

EVELYN ERSANILLI and RUUD KOOPMANS

Various theoretical perspectives make strong, but often contradictory, claims about effects of immigrant integration policies on immigrants' retention of their ethnic cultures and their adoption of the host country's culture. However, there is very little empirical research investigating these competing claims. This article addresses this gap by investigating the merits of four prominent theoretical perspectives, which emphasise respectively the material costs and benefits of retention and adoption, acculturative stress, the permeability of ethnic boundaries, and reactive ethnicity. It uses original survey data on Turkish immigrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, countries with different integration regimes, and investigates identification, language proficiency and use, religious observance and interethnic social contacts. The results indicate that policies have only a modest effect on immigrants' degree of adoption and retention. The findings clearly contradict the reactive ethnicity and acculturative stress hypotheses, and provide support for a combination of the material cost/benefit and boundary permeability perspectives.

European countries have historically followed different immigrant integration approaches (see e.g. Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999; Favell 2001). Several cross-national research projects (e.g. MIPEX, EMILIE, NATAC)[1] have attempted to formulate 'best practices'. However these studies generally do not take the effects of policies into account. In fact very little is known about the extent to which policies affect actual levels of immigrant integration, and if so in what direction these effects go. The aim of this article is to investigate the merits of different theoretical perspectives on the effects of integration policies. This can best be examined in a cross-national study. Although cross-national studies of immigrant integration have recently become more

Correspondence Address: evelyn.ersanilli@qeh.ox.ac.uk; koopmans@wzb.eu

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frequent, most focus on socio-economic aspects such as labour market participation and income (e.g. Euwals *et al*. 2007; Kogan 2007; Muus 2003; van Tubergen *et al*. 2004). This article focuses on socio-cultural integration. Policy innovations of the last decade such as mandatory civic integration and language courses for recent immigrants (see e.g. Joppke 2007; Michalowski 2007) and the recent formalisation and extension of naturalisation tests in several countries (see e.g. de Hart and van Oers 2006) indicate a growing concern with socio-cultural aspects of immigrant integration such as language skills, interethnic relations, identification with the host society, and the role of religion, in particular Islam. These aspects of integration are viewed both as important in their own right, and as conditions for successful socio-economic integration. Cross-national studies of socio-cultural aspects of integration are few and far between, with some exceptions regarding language acquisition (Chiswick and Miller 1995; van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005), religious affiliation and attendance (van Tubergen 2005), and identification and social contacts (Berry *et al*. 2006; Dagevos *et al*. 2006).

Previous comparative studies of immigrant integration faced significant problems of cross-national comparability related to the highly divergent composition of immigrant populations across countries regarding immigrants' national origins, recruitment from different regions and social strata within these countries, as well as different temporal trajectories of migration (Favell 2003). We chose a research design that circumvents, or at least greatly reduces, many of these problems by focusing on one clearly circumscribed immigrant group, namely immigrants from selected parts of rural Turkey who arrived in the countries of destination before 1975, as well as their direct descendants. For the destination country, we focus on Germany, France, and the Netherlands, where more than 70 per cent of people of Turkish origin in the European Union live. These countries have followed distinct approaches to immigrant integration over the past decades, and therefore differ significantly on our independent variable of theoretical interest.

In line with Berry (1997), we assume there are two independent dimensions of socio-cultural integration, namely the degree to which immigrants maintain their culture of origin (ethnic retention) and the degree to which they adopt the host country's culture (host culture adoption). We investigate four common indicators of retention and adoption: identification, language use and proficiency, interethnic social contacts, and religious observance (see e.g. Berry *et al*. 2006; Dagevos 2001; Gans 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

In what follows, we first explain our theoretical conceptualisation of immigrant integration policy approaches along two dimensions, namely state accommodation of diversity and access to individual citizenship rights. This is followed by a discussion of theories on the relationships between the two policy dimensions on one side and retention and adoption on the other. Two broad theoretical perspectives can be distinguished: political–sociological theories, which emphasise the material costs and benefits of retention and adoption, and social–psychological theories, which emphasise

acculturative stress, emotional costs, and reactive ethnicity. From these theories, we deduce a total of five hypotheses. We then show how Germany, France and the Netherlands differ along the two dimensions of integration policies. Subsequently, we present our research design and the results of multivariate regression analyses, in which we control for a range of additional variables that might affect our dependent variables, including regional origin, socio-economic status, generation and the relative size and within-country distribution of the Turkish immigrant population. Our findings show that after controlling for these additional factors, significant cross-national differences remain regarding most aspects of retention and adoption. However, in contrast to the important role that is attributed to integration policies in current debates, these cross-national differences turn out to be relatively modest. The directions of these differences invalidate the predictions of some widely prevalent theories on the effects of integration policies, and suggest modifications of others.

Integration Policies and Integration Outcomes: Conceptualisation, Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

Van Tubergen (2004) grouped the factors influencing immigrant integration into 'destination country', 'origin country' and 'context or community' effects. Our main interest here is the exploration of destination country effects, and particularly the question to what extent different theories of integration policy effects are able to predict cross-national differences. The reason for this focus is the discrepancy between the large amount of political and scientific attention devoted to integration policies, and the very limited knowledge that exists about the size and direction of the effects of integration policies.

Several typologies on how nation states respond to immigrants exist (e.g. Berry 2001; Castles 1995; Entzinger 2000; Soysal 1994), which usually distinguish the degree of legal inclusiveness towards individual immigrants on the one hand, and the accommodation of cultural group differences on the other. Koopmans *et al*. (2005; see also Koopmans and Statham 2000) label these two dimensions ethnic–civic and monist–pluralist. The ethnic–civic dimension concerns the degree to which immigrants are seen as members of the host society and receive the same legal rights and protection as the host population. The monism–pluralism dimension concerns the degree to which receiving societies accommodate the cultural identity of immigrants by supporting ethnic and religious group formation or by granting special rights or exempting cultural groups from certain obligations.

There are several theoretical perspectives on how integration policy approaches may affect immigrants' ethnic and religious retention and host culture adoption. The different relationships hypothesised by these theories are summarised in Figure 1. A first perspective (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2001; van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005) sees integration policy

FIGURE 1
THEORETICAL MODEL



approaches as opportunity structures that raise or lower the material costs and benefits attached to retention and adoption. In this view, policies that accommodate cultural and religious diversity increase the material benefits of retention or lower its costs. Material benefits include subsidies for ethnic organisations, possibilities to set up ethnic media, mother tongue teaching programmes, and religious schools. These ethnic institutions can stimulate retention by providing a platform for ethnic cultural and religious life. Policies that accommodate diversity can also stimulate retention by providing groups that claim minority status a channel for political demands in the form of special consultative bodies. Further, such policies can lower the costs of retention by allowing expressions of particularistic identities in the public sphere, for instance if women who wear a headscarf can attend public school or get a job as a teacher or in the civil service. This leads to the hypothesis that, due to lower costs and higher benefits, immigrants will display higher levels of ethnic and religious retention in countries with policies that accommodate diversity (H1).

In a similar vein, several authors have suggested that a policy emphasis on the facilitation of cultural difference may have unintended consequences for immigrants' orientation on the host society (Barry 2001; Koopmans 2002; Meyer 2002). If immigrants have access to services in their mother tongue and through ethnic organisations, there are fewer incentives for them to learn the host country language and to seek interethnic contacts with host country natives. To the extent that culturally accommodative policies are combined with no or limited assimilation requirements for access to naturalisation or permanent residence permits, the benefits associated with adoption will be further reduced. Thus, seen from the cost/benefit perspective, state accommodation of diversity should lead to lower levels of host culture adoption (H2).

However, other theorists have argued the exact opposite, namely that the accommodation of diversity can stimulate participation in the institutions of the host society and create a sense of belonging (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002; Bloemraad 2006). In this view, policies that recognise and

facilitate expressions of cultural diversity lower the 'acculturative stress' of balancing the ethnic and host culture (Berry *et al.* 1987; cf. Alba 2005) and thereby reduce the emotional costs of adoption. Following this perspective, we should find that host culture adoption is higher in countries with policies that accommodate diversity (H3).

Social psychologists have drawn on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986) to argue that the perceived permeability of group boundaries affects host culture adoption (Padilla and Perez 2003; Verkuyten 2006; Ward and Leong 2006; see also Bourhis *et al.* 1997). They argue that people want to maintain a positive self-concept, and are only likely to identify with a group if they feel they will be accepted by it, i.e. if boundaries are perceived as permeable. Low permeability increases the emotional costs of adoption because adoption is not likely to lead to acceptance by members of the host society which in turn can negatively affect self-esteem. The perception of group boundaries is of course affected by many factors, including everyday discrimination, as well as structural inequalities in institutions such as the labour market and the education system. Here, however, we focus on the supposed effects of legal equality and the inclusive notion of citizenship that it signals. Relatively easy access to equal citizenship rights and state protection from discrimination signal that immigrants are welcome to become full members of the host society. Therefore, the boundary permeability perspective leads us to expect that in countries with a higher degree of individual legal equality immigrants show a higher degree of adoption (H4).

Finally, according to 'reactive ethnicity' theory, exclusion from legal equality will not only limit the possibilities for adoption, but also increase retention as a source of positive self-esteem (e.g. Verkuyten and Brug 2002; Verkuyten 2006). Reactive ethnicity occurs not only in response to personal experiences of discrimination, but also when people believe that other members of their ethnic group are discriminated or excluded from the host society (Padilla and Perez 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). This leads to the prediction that a low degree of legal equality leads to more ethnic retention (H5).

Integration Policies in Germany, France, and the Netherlands

Germany, France and the Netherlands have been described as exponents of different integration policy regimes (see e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995). Against typologies of integration regimes, some have argued that integration policies are influenced by pressures for international convergence rather than by national ideologies (e.g. Freeman 2004; Joppke 2007; Weil 2001). Of course, immigrant integration policies are not set in stone and have changed over the years. Further, it is important to keep in mind that the rights of immigrants are not only influenced by policies that aim specifically at immigrant integration but also by other institutional settings such as the historically embedded relation between the state and religious cults (see e.g. Soysal 1994; Favell 2001; Entzinger 2005).

Recent comparative studies of integration policies reveal broadly similar cross-national differences. Koopmans *et al*. (2010) have empirically investigated policy changes in ten European countries (including the three that are investigated in this article) over three decades (1980–2008) on the basis of 42 indicators. Figure 2 presents the position of German, French and Dutch policies along the two dimensions in the years 1980, 1990, 2002 and 2008.

Even though Germany and the Netherlands have experienced shifts towards more pluralist and civic policies – with some reversal since 2002 – there is little sign of policy convergence, and differences between Germany, France, and the Netherlands have remained substantial. The policies in the three countries are each closer to one of three ideal-types. German policies most resemble an ethnic-assimilationist regime characterised by difficult access for immigrants to individual citizenship rights and little accommodation of diversity. French policies come closest to a civic-assimilationist regime characterised by easy access to individual legal equality but little

FIGURE 2
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1980–2008



Source: Koopmans *et al*. (2010).

accommodation of diversity. Dutch policies, finally, most resemble a multiculturalist regime with easy access to individual legal equality combined with a high degree of accommodation of diversity. This classification is in line with other studies. Banting *et al.* (2006) investigated the period 1980 to 2000 and also found that Dutch policies provided a higher degree of accommodation of diversity than French and German policies. Evidence for 2006 summarised in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)[2] shows that Germany scores particularly low on policies of access to nationality and anti-discrimination (where France and the Netherlands are very close together), whereas France scores lowest among the three countries (and the Netherlands highest) on the indicator cluster that most clearly taps group rights, namely political participation, which includes special consultative bodies for immigrants and subsidies for their organisations. To put some flesh on the bones of these quantitative indicators, we now provide a short qualitative overview of the policy differences between the three countries on the two dimensions.

Accommodation of Diversity

The three countries differ in the degree to which expressions of religious faith can be a barrier to full participation in public life. The Netherlands provides most room for Muslims to publicly express their religion. In public schools, the wearing of headscarves by both students and teachers is allowed without restrictions. There is a ban on headscarves and other religious signs in only a limited number of positions within the civil service (the courts and the police). In France the wearing of a headscarf is prohibited for all civil servants, including teachers, and also for primary and secondary school students. In contrast to France, students in Germany are allowed to wear a headscarf, but in the majority of federal states teachers and other civil servants are not. While France bans all 'ostentatious' religious symbols and in that sense treats Islam and other religions alike, various southern German states have banned Muslim headscarves, while nuns teaching in public schools can wear their habits.

All three countries demand linguistic and cultural assimilation of applicants for naturalisation, but to varying extents. Until 2003, the Dutch assimilation requirement entailed only a very modest assessment of oral language proficiency. Since 2003, language requirements have been tightened and a formal test has to be passed. In France linguistic and cultural assimilation is assessed in a personal interview with a civil servant. The required level of both types of assimilation is much higher than in the pre-2003 Dutch law (see e.g. Hagedorn 1998; Zoka 2002). Germany has always required linguistic assimilation and until 2000 also a fairly high degree of social assimilation. The naturalisation guidelines that were in effect until 2000 explicitly viewed commitment to Germany and to the country and culture of origin as mutually exclusive (see Hailbronner and Renner 1998).

Finally, the three countries have to different degrees allowed minorities to set up institutions on an ethnic and religious basis. In the Netherlands, legislation originating in the time of 'pillarization' (Lijphart 1968) has facilitated the founding of fully publicly funded Islamic and Hindu schools and broadcasting corporations. Currently, there are about 45 publicly funded Islamic schools in the Netherlands, compared to two in Germany and one in France. The Dutch national public broadcaster NPS is required to direct 20 per cent of its programmes to ethnic minority audiences,[3] and there are subsidised Islamic and Hindu broadcasting corporations. By contrast, special public media organisations or broadcasts for immigrant groups are rare in Germany and absent in France (where public media are required by law to broadcast only in French). The Netherlands has an extensive system of subsidised ethnic consultative bodies for each major ethnic group (e.g. Turks, Surinamese). Germany has local consultative bodies, the *Ausländerbeiräte*, but all immigrant groups are represented together in one advisory council. Aside from a modest number of local advisory boards, France has no structure for the consultation of ethnic minorities, though it has – like the Netherlands and Germany – recently set up a consultation body for Muslims.

Access to Individual Citizenship Rights

The ease with which immigrants can become citizens is an important determinant of access to rights, which include not only the right to vote and stand for office, but also access to certain welfare benefits, employment as a civil servant, full protection against expulsion, and freedom from visa obligations when travelling abroad. France and the Netherlands grant easier access to citizenship than Germany. This is reflected in shorter residence requirements for naturalisation (five years, against eight in Germany), greater acceptance of dual nationality, and easier access to the citizenship for the second generation. Until the introduction of birthright citizenship in 2000, German-born children of immigrants could acquire citizenship only through naturalisation, though since 1991 a facilitated procedure has applied. The Netherlands introduced an option right to citizenship in 1985 and France has automatically attributed citizenship to the second generation at the age of majority since 1889. France and especially the Netherlands also have more extensive anti-discrimination policies than Germany.

Research Design

Comparative studies of immigrant integration usually rely either on independently gathered national immigrant surveys with divergent questions and sampling methods, or on cross-national surveys such as the European Social Survey that are not specifically targeted at immigrants, who therefore tend to be strongly underrepresented, among other things because the

questionnaire is only offered in the host country language. These studies moreover face the problem of widely diverging compositions of the immigrant population across countries. The resulting composition effects can only approximately be controlled statistically. For instance, representative surveys will include hardly any Bangladeshis outside, and virtually no Turks within the United Kingdom. Second, there is often significant variation among immigrants from the same country of origin, in terms of the timing and type (guest-worker, family formation, asylum, etc.) of immigration, and in terms of regions of origin within sending countries, which differ in, for example, degree of modernisation and ethnic composition. Existing cross-national surveys rarely contain information on the region of origin and often lack information on the type of immigration (see also Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

To control for composition effects, we do not use a representative survey of all immigrant groups, but circumscribe our target group in a number of ways. First we focus on immigrants from the same country, Turkey, which is the most important country of origin of immigrants in the EU (Lederer 1997). With about 2.5 million people of Turkish origin, Germany has been the main destination of Turkish migration. France and the Netherlands follow with each about 350,000 people of Turkish descent (De Tapia 2001). Since Turkey has never been colonised by nor shares a language with any of the host countries, Turkish immigrants form a relatively comparable group. All three countries originally had an active recruitment policy for Turkish guest-workers, but after the ending of guest-worker recruitment (around 1974), the inflow of Turkish immigrants started to diverge due to differences in family migration regulations, residence permit policies, and the differential inflow of asylum seekers (see e.g. Muus 2003; Dagevos *et al*. 2006). To control for the resulting composition effects, we limit the target population to Turkish immigrants who arrived before 1975, as well as their offspring. Immigrants who arrived as adults after 1975, mostly as spouses or asylum seekers, are not included in our sample.

In addition, we control for differences in regional origins of Turkish immigrants. The large regional differences within Turkey in terms of religious life, education levels and ethnic composition may be an important disturbing factor for cross-national comparison because Turks in different immigration countries often come from specific regions (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003; Dagevos *et al*. 2006). To prevent regional differences in Turkey confounding our cross-national comparison, we limit the target group to migrants from two regions in central Turkey; south-central and east-central Anatolia.[4] South-central Anatolia is a predominantly ethnic Turkish and religiously conservative region. East-central Anatolia has more ethnic and religious diversity (Kurds and Alevites). Alevism is a humanistic current within Islam. In general the relation between the sexes is different from that prevalent within Sunni Islam, and Alevite women rarely wear headscarves.

Sampling and Data Collection

In the Netherlands we could have relied on population registries to sample people of Turkish descent, but in France and Germany ethnic background is not registered. Therefore, we had to choose other ways to draw a cross-nationally comparable sample. Our main method was sampling from online phonebooks, based on stems of Turkish surnames. Surname-based sampling from phonebooks has been shown to be an efficient and representative method for the study of immigrant populations in general, and Turks in particular (see Galonska *et al.* 2004; Granato 1999; Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000; Salentin 1999). Still, it might have a bias since not all Turkish immigrant households are listed in the phonebook and those listed may differ from those who are not. Therefore we used supplementary sampling techniques. In the summer of 2005, towns and villages in the Turkish provinces of Karaman (south-central Anatolia) and Sivas (east-central Anatolia) were visited. Migrants who spent their holidays in their home towns were asked to provide their phone number to be contacted later. This sample may also contain a bias, since only immigrants who have maintained a connection to their region of origin are included. Finally, we used a snowball technique by asking respondents for phone numbers of relatives and friends from the same region of origin. Snowball sampling is often criticised for violating the random sample assumption. None of the three sampling techniques is therefore free of potential biases. In all the regressions reported below, dummy variables were included to control for the sampling technique by which a respondent was recruited. We find no significant differences between the three sub-samples in any of our regressions.

Data were collected between November 2005 and June 2006 by means of a standardised phone survey, using bilingual interviewers and questionnaires. At the start of each contact, filter questions were asked about regional origin and the timing of the migration of the respondent or his or her parents. Only those who fulfilled our target population criteria were interviewed, totalling 1,000 respondents: 273 in the Netherlands, 295 in Germany and 432 in France.[5]

Variables

We measured four aspects of ethnic retention – identification with Turks, Turkish language proficiency, identification with Muslims, and observance of religious practices – and four aspects of host culture adoption – identification with the host country, host country language proficiency, host country language use, and social contacts with host country ethnics. We treat Islamic religiosity as part of cultural retention since Islam is the dominant religion in Turkey but not in any of the host countries. The Appendix gives the means and standard deviations for all dependent and independent variables used in the analyses.

All three measures of identification were measured separately by means of three items; 'To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?', 'To what extent do you feel [group member]?', and 'To what extent are you proud of being [group member]?' Answer categories ranged from 1, 'not at all' to 5, 'completely'. The scores on these items were averaged to form scales of host country identification (Cronbach's alpha 0.78), Turkish identification (alpha 0.68), and Muslim identification (alpha 0.80).

Proficiency in the host country language and in Turkish was measured by asking respondents how often they experienced problems in understanding these languages. Respondents could answer along a 5-point scale from 1, 'never' to 5, 'always'. For analysis, we used inverse scores so that a score of 1 means that a respondent always has problems understanding the respective language and 5 means he or she never experiences such problems. Language use was measured by asking respondents which language they spoke most frequently with their friends, partner, and children: Turkish, the host country language, or both about equally often. Answers were scored 0, 'always Turkish,' 0.5, 'equally often' and 1, 'always French/Dutch/German'. Average scores across these three questions were combined in a scale (Cronbach's alpha 0.66).[6]

Religious observance was measured by four questions: frequency of eating halal food, participation in Ramadan, wearing a headscarf (or for males: whether their partner wears a headscarf), and visiting a mosque. Answer categories for the first three items ranged from 1, 'never' to 4, 'always'. The scale for mosque visits ranged from 1, 'never' to 6, 'daily'. The *z*-scores of these items were averaged and combined in a scale (Cronbach's alpha 0.77).[7] Those – very few – respondents who defined themselves as non-religious or who adhered to another faith than Islam were excluded from the analysis of the religion variables. Finally, to measure interethnic social contacts, respondents were asked about the ethnic composition of the social group they go out with. Answer categories were 1, 'predominantly Turkish', 2, 'about equally mixed', and 3, 'predominantly people of Dutch/German/French descent'.

The data were analysed with ordinary least squares regression analysis.[8] All analyses are controlled for a number of individual-level and context variables that are known to influence adoption and retention (see e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001; van Tubergen 2004). To control for generation effects, we included dummies for the second generation (those born in the host country) and the 1.5th or in-between generation (those born in Turkey but migrated before the age of 18).[9] First-generation immigrants are the reference category. We also controlled for sex, marital status, level of education, employment, region of origin (using south-central Anatolia as reference category), Alevite denomination, and sampling method. Finally, to ensure that cross-national differences cannot be attributed to group size and concentration, all regressions reported below are controlled for the population share of Turkish immigrants in the respondent's place of residence.[10]

Since we compare only three countries, it is not possible to include quantitative measures of the two integration policy dimensions or other variables on the country level in the regressions. Country differences are therefore captured by dummy variables, with Turks living in Germany as the reference category. We do not want to claim that effects of these dummy variables can be entirely ascribed to integration policies. Obviously, other variables on the country level – e.g. socio-economic inequalities, welfare state regimes or patterns of discrimination – may also play a role. We follow a falsification approach by investigating to what extent the country differences that we find conform to the contrasting hypotheses that can be derived from various theoretical views on integration policy effects.

Results

Ethnic Retention

We first investigate the two contrasting hypotheses regarding ethnic retention. Following the material cost/benefit hypothesis (H1), retention is promoted when countries tolerate and facilitate cultural diversity, and should therefore be highest in the Netherlands and lower in France and Germany. By contrast, hypothesis 5 is based on the concept of reactive ethnicity states, that a lack of legal equality promotes ethnic retention, which leads us to expect the highest level of ethnic retention in Germany. Our dependent variables encompass four indicators of cultural retention, two referring to the ethnic Turkish culture, and two to Islamic religiosity. Table 1 shows the results of regression analyses of these four indicators.

Turkish identification is very strong in all three countries at a cross-national average of 4.46 on a five-point scale and the cross-national average of Turkish language proficiency is also high at 3.99 on a five-point scale (see Appendix). For these variables, we do not find support for either of the two hypotheses, as there are no significant differences among the three host countries. We do however find some effects of the control variables. Turkish identification is lower among Alevites and those originating in east-central Anatolia, as well as among members of the in-between generation and the highly educated. Turkish language proficiency is lower among those from east-central Anatolia, the 1.5th and second generations, the more highly educated, and among those currently employed.

Next, we turn to the two indicators of religious retention. We find that identification with Muslims is very strong in all three countries, ranging from a score on the five-point scale of 4.32 for German Turks to 4.59 for Dutch Turks, a difference that is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). As Table 1 shows, country differences in religious identification persist after we control for the individual-level variables and the size of the Turkish community. In line with hypothesis 1, Dutch Turks have the highest level of Muslim identification, although the difference is only significant compared

TABLE 1
UNSTANDARDISED COEFFICIENTS OF OLS REGRESSION OF FOUR MEASURES OF ETHNIC RETENTION (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)

	Turkish identification		**Turkish language proficiency**		**Muslim identification**		**Religious observance**	
Germany (Ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
France	0.08	(0.06)	−0.17	(0.09)	0.07	(0.07)	0.19**	(0.06)
Netherlands	0.05	(0.06)	−0.02	(0.09)	0.16*	(0.07)	0.24***	(0.06)
East-Central Anatolia	−0.12*	(0.05)	−0.15*	(0.07)	−0.12*	(0.05)	−0.09	(0.05)
Alevi	−0.35***	(0.08)	−0.23	(0.13)	−0.76***	(0.09)	−1.48***	(0.08)
Generation1	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Generation 1.5	−0.18*	(0.07)	−0.53***	(0.11)	−0.18*	(0.08)	−0.09	(0.07)
Generation 2	−0.13	(0.09)	−0.72***	(0.13)	−0.08	(0.10)	−0.22*	(0.08)
Female	−0.07	(0.05)	−0.12	(0.07)	−0.01	(0.05)	−0.27***	(0.04)
Married	−0.01	(0.06)	0.14	(0.09)	−0.06	(0.07)	0.01	(0.06)
Education, none/ primary	Ref		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Secondary education	−0.05	(0.07)	−0.24*	(0.10)	−0.15*	(0.07)	−0.17**	(0.06)
Post-secondary education	−0.33***	(0.09)	−0.30*	(0.13)	−0.36***	(0.10)	−0.26**	(0.09)
Working	−0.09	(0.05)	−0.17*	(0.07)	−0.11*	(0.05)	−0.14**	(0.05)
Phone book sample	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Holiday sample	0.14	(0.07)	−0.10	(0.11)	0.08	(0.08)	0.09	(0.07)
Snowball sample	0.09	(0.05)	−0.10	(0.07)	0.09	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)
%Turkish immigrants	0.02	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	0.04*	(0.02)	0.04*	(0.02)
Constant	4.70***	(0.11)	4.81***	(0.16)	4.75***	(0.12)	0.35***	(0.10)
Adj. R^2	*0.09*		*0.14*		*0.16*		*0.42*	
N	*924*		*923*		*884*		*888*	

Note: Two-tailed t-tests.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

to German Turks. The fact that German Turks display the lowest level of religious retention is in full contradiction to the expectations of the reactive ethnicity hypothesis (H5). On the individual level, Alevites, those from east-central Anatolia, and the 1.5th generation show lower levels of Muslim identification, as do the highly educated and those currently employed. Living in an area with a high percentage of Turkish immigrants is associated with higher levels of Muslim identification.

The results for Islamic religious observance are similar. Religious observance is high in all three countries. The majority of the respondents always eat halal food, ranging from 67 per cent in France to 72 per cent in the Netherlands. The observance of Ramadan is lowest in Germany; only 55 per cent of Sunnite respondents always observe Ramadan, compared to more than 80 per cent in France and the Netherlands. Mosque attendance varies little between the countries, with about 60 per cent of males and

10 per cent of females visiting a mosque at least once a week. Headscarves are worn most in the Netherlands and least in Germany. In the Netherlands 50 per cent of female Sunnite respondents always wear a headscarf, compared to 40 per cent in France and 30 per cent in Germany. Overall, the index of the four items of religious retention is highest in the Netherlands and lowest in Germany ($p < 0.001$). The multivariate analysis shows that significant cross-national differences remain after controlling for composition effects and size of Turkish population. These country differences are similar but more pronounced than those for Muslim identification. In line with hypothesis 1, the level of Islamic religious observance is highest in the Netherlands, but again the difference is only significant in comparison with Germany. Once more, the reactive ethnicity hypothesis can be rejected, because Germany displays by far the lowest level of religious retention. On the individual level, Alevites, women, members of the second generation, the more highly educated, and those currently employed are less religiously observant. Those living in areas with many Turkish immigrants are significantly more religiously observant.

Summing up, the results for ethnic and religious retention clearly falsify the reactive ethnicity perspective, which predicted the highest levels of retention in Germany and the lowest in the Netherlands. For Turkish ethnic retention, we found no significant country differences at all, and for Muslim religious retention the results went exactly counter to the reactive ethnicity hypothesis. The fact that we find no significant country differences regarding Turkish ethnic retention of course also contradicts the rival cost/benefit hypothesis, which predicted the greatest retention in the Netherlands. The results for religious retention are, however, broadly in line with this hypothesis, as Dutch Turks have the highest levels of Muslim identification and religious observance. The size of these country differences is quite modest though. If we remove the country dummies from the regressions of religious identification and observance displayed in Table 1, the explained variance drops only 1 and 2 per cent, respectively.[11]

Host Culture Adoption

We now investigate the merits of the three hypotheses that refer to the effects of policies on the adoption of the host society's culture. The material cost/benefit hypothesis (H2), which states that the accommodation of diversity provides disincentives for adoption of the host culture, and the acculturative stress hypothesis (H3), which argues that the accommodation of diversity promotes adoption, provide the clearest contrast, as they imply respectively the lowest and highest level of adoption of host culture in the Netherlands. The boundary permeability hypothesis (H4), which argues that easily accessible legal equality promotes adoption of host culture, leads to a slightly different expectation of higher levels of adoption of host culture in both the Netherlands and France.

Table 2 shows the results of regressions of the four adoption variables. Host country identification does not come close to the level of Turkish identification in any of the countries. Whereas Turkish identification averaged close to the maximum value of 5 in all three countries, host country identification ranges from 2.31 in Germany to 2.80 in the Netherlands ($p < 0.001$). Controlling for background variables, the degree of identification with the host country still shows highly significant cross-national differences that conform exactly to the expectation of the boundary permeability hypothesis (H4). Host country identification is significantly higher in France and the Netherlands, which offer immigrants easier access to citizenship rights than Germany. The two other hypotheses do not offer convincing explanations of the cross-national pattern. Contrary to the material cost/benefit hypothesis (H2), Dutch Turks identify comparatively strongly with their country of residence, even though there is little policy pressure on them to do so. Contrary to the acculturative stress hypothesis (H3), French Turks have a relatively high level of identification with their

TABLE 2
UNSTANDARDISED COEFFICIENTS OF OLS REGRESSION OF FOUR MEASURES OF ADOPTION OF HOST CULTURE (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)

	Host country identification		**Host country language prof**		**Host country language use**		**Social contacts**	
Germany (Ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
France	0.53***	(0.09)	0.14	(0.08)	0.11***	(0.02)	.13**	(0.05)
Netherlands	0.56***	(0.09)	−0.03[a]	(0.08)	−0.01[b]	(0.02)	−0.03[a]	(0.05)
East-Central Anatolia	0.21**	(0.07)	0.04	(0.07)	0.06**	(0.02)	0.07	(0.04)
Alevi	0.07	(0.12)	0.09	(0.11)	0.10**	(0.03)	0.04	(0.07)
Generation1 (ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Generation 1.5	0.12	(0.11)	0.66***	(0.10)	0.14***	(0.03)	0.13*	(0.06)
Generation 2	0.28*	(0.13)	0.91***	(0.12)	0.21***	(0.03)	0.05	(0.07)
Female	−0.02	(0.07)	−0.02	(0.06)	0.05**	(0.02)	0.00	(0.04)
Married	0.30**	(0.09)	−0.14	(0.08)	−0.22***	(0.02)	−0.07	(0.05)
Education, none/primary	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Secondary education	0.38***	(0.10)	1.04***	(0.09)	0.17***	(0.03)	0.20***	(0.06)
Post-secondary education	0.53***	(0.13)	1.39***	(0.12)	0.25***	(0.03)	0.34***	(0.07)
Working	−0.02	(0.07)	0.16*	(0.07)	0.05**	(0.02)	0.14***	(0.04)
Phone book sample	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Holiday sample	0.05	(0.11)	−0.09	(0.10)	0.05	(0.03)	−0.07	(0.06)
Snowball sample	0.00	(0.07)	0.04	(0.07)	0.03	(0.02)	0.01	(0.04)
%Turkish immigrants	0.01	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)	−0.01*	(0.01)	−0.02	(0.01)
Constant	1.43***	(0.15)	2.38***	(0.14)	0.16***	(0.04)	1.31***	(0.09)
Adj. R^2	*0.09*		*0.42*		*0.40*		*0.09*	
N	*926*		*925*		*925*		*901*	

Note: Two-tailed t-tests.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.
[a]The difference between France and the Netherlands is significant ($p < 0.05$).
[b]The difference between France and the Netherlands is significant ($p < 0.001$).

host country, even though the French context – think for instance of the headscarf ban – seems to require exactly the kind of choices between ethnic and host cultures that are seen as causing acculturative stress. On the individual level, those from east-central Anatolia, the second generation, married people and the more highly educated display higher levels of host country identification.

We now turn to proficiency in and use of the host country's language. Not unexpectedly, in all three countries self-assessed proficiency in the host country language varies greatly across the generations. Cross-national differences are strongest among the second generation, where 53 per cent in the Netherlands, 58 per cent in Germany and 74 per cent in France indicate that they never have problems speaking the host country's language (difference between France and Germany $p < 0.05$; between France and the Netherlands $p < 0.01$). When controlling for background variables, the remaining difference between German and French Turks is no longer significant, but Dutch and French Turks continue to differ significantly. This result conforms most to the material cost/benefit hypothesis (H2), which predicted that the lack of assimilation pressures in the Netherlands would lead to a weaker orientation towards the host country's culture. The acculturative stress hypothesis (H3) must again be rejected, because it had predicted precisely the opposite result for the Netherlands. The boundary permeability hypothesis (H4) also fares quite badly. Although it did predict high levels of linguistic assimilation in France, it cannot account for the fact that proficiency in the host country's language is lowest in the Netherlands. Apart from the strong generational differences, we find that on the individual level, proficiency in the host country's language is higher among the more highly educated and the currently employed.

Results for the frequency of use of the host country's language are broadly similar. Among the first and in-between generations, Turkish is the dominant language in all three countries. Country differences in language use are particularly pronounced in the second generation. On a scale from 0 (always Turkish) to 1 (always the host country's language) Turkish is still slightly dominant among the Dutch second generation (0.46), compared to exactly equal shares in Germany (0.50) and a strong predominance of French language use among the French-Turkish second generation (0.65). The cross-national differences that remain after controlling for background variables are stronger than those for language proficiency. French Turks use the host country's language significantly more often than both Dutch and German Turks. These results again lead to a clear rejection of the acculturative stress hypothesis (H3), which predicted the highest level of adoption of the host culture in the Netherlands. The results are mixed for the two other hypotheses. In line with the material cost/benefit hypothesis (H2) the absence of strong assimilation pressures in the Netherlands is associated with low levels of Dutch language use, but the hypothesis did not predict that use of the host country's language is also low in Germany. The

permeable boundaries hypothesis (H4) does predict the high level of host country language use in France, but fails to account for its low level in the Netherlands. Regarding the control variables, use of the host country's language increases with higher education, being currently employed, having an east-central Anatolian or Alevite background, and being female and unmarried. Persons living in areas with a high concentration of Turks use the host country's language significantly less often.

Our final indicator of host culture adoption refers to private social contacts with host country ethnics. In all three countries, the orientation of social contacts is predominantly towards other Turks. On a scale ranging from 1 (only Turks) to 3 (only host country ethnics), the level of social contacts ranges between 1.56 for Dutch Turks to 1.69 for French Turks ($p < .05$), i.e. well below the scale mid-point of 2, which indicates equal levels of contacts with Turks and with host country ethnics. After controlling for the background variables, French Turks still have significantly higher degrees of host country contacts than their counterparts in the Netherlands and Germany. This result leads us once more to fully reject the acculturative stress hypothesis, which predicted the highest level of interethnic contact in the Netherlands. Results for the two other hypotheses are again mixed, the material cost/benefit hypothesis failing to account for the low level of interethnic contacts in Germany, and the boundary permeability hypothesis failing to account for the low level of such contacts in the Netherlands. On the individual level, members of the in-between generation, the more highly educated and those currently employed report higher levels of social contact with host country ethnics.

Summing up, the results clearly contradict the acculturative stress hypothesis, which predicted the highest levels of host culture adoption in the Netherlands, and lower levels in France and Germany, where assimilation pressures are supposed to throw up psychological barriers towards adoption of the host culture. Results for the two other hypotheses are mixed. The boundary permeability hypothesis is fully in line with the results for host country identification, which are highest in France and the Netherlands, the two countries that offer the greatest degree of legal equality. The high levels of linguistic assimilation and interethnic social contacts in France also fit this hypothesis, but not the fact that the Netherlands scores lowest on these aspects of adoption, in spite of the fact that it offers even more legal equality than France. By contrast, the lack of material incentives and pressures for assimilation in the Netherlands, which is emphasised by the material cost/benefit hypothesis, is able to explain the low levels of adoption in the Netherlands, and the high levels in France, but fails to explain why assimilation pressures do not seem to stimulate adoption in Germany. Apart from these ambiguous results, the explanatory merits of these hypotheses are also relativised by the explanatory power of differences between countries, which again is relatively modest. Removing the country dummies from the regressions in Table 2 reduces the explained variance with 5 per cent for host

country identification, less than 0.5 per cent for language proficiency, 2 per cent for language use, and 1 per cent for interethnic social contacts.[12] Only in the case of host country identification does this constitute a sizeable proportion of the total explained variance.

Discussion and Conclusions

Immigrant integration policies have been hotly debated in recent years in many countries, and the suggestion is that policies of the 'right type' offer solutions for many immigrant integration problems, whereas policies of the 'wrong type' can have disastrous effects on immigrant integration. Despite strongly divergent ideas about which are the 'right' and the 'wrong' policies, there seems to be consensus about the fact that policies matter, and that they matter a lot.

In the scientific debate we likewise find divergent theories on policy effects, and again the implicit assumption seems to be that policies can do a lot of good as well as a lot of harm. This article has examined the empirical merits of various such theories in accounting for cross-national patterns of ethnic and religious retention, on the one hand, and adoption of the host country's culture, on the other. We tested five hypotheses derived from four theoretical perspectives which respectively emphasise material costs and benefits, reactive ethnicity, acculturative stress, and boundary permeability. The material costs and benefits perspective argues that by granting resources and rights on the basis of ethnic or religious differences and not throwing up high cultural barriers to the acquisition of citizenship rights, countries increase the benefits and decrease the costs of ethnic retention. This is supposed to lead to higher levels of retention among immigrants (H1). These same policies also lower the benefits of host culture adoption, which should therefore be lower in countries with policies that accommodate cultural diversity (H2). According to acculturative stress theory, host culture adoption is less likely to occur when policies demand from immigrants, by way of assimilation requirements or restrictions on expressions of ethnic and religious difference, that they distance themselves from their culture of origin. This leads to the hypothesis that adoption of host culture is higher in countries with policies that accommodate diversity (H3). Boundary permeability suggests that adoption of host culture is stimulated by policies that grant immigrants a high degree of equality (H4), because this signals acceptance by the host country. Finally, the reactive ethnicity perspective argues that in response to low levels of legal equality, immigrants withdraw into their own ethnic group. Therefore immigrants should show higher levels of retention in countries with policies that grant less legal equality (H5). These hypotheses were tested in a comparison of Turkish immigrants and their descendants in three countries that have pursued different integration policies: Germany, France and the Netherlands. Compared to France and Germany, the Netherlands has a higher degree of

accommodation of diversity. Germany has historically granted immigrants less legal equality than France and the Netherlands.

The challenge in investigating policy outcomes lies in the large number of potential confounding variables. With our research design we have been able to control for several of these variables. By limiting our research population to Turkish guest-workers who migrated before 1975 and originated in two selected regions in Turkey and their offspring, we excluded confounding factors related to regional origin and the timing and type of immigration.

In view of the importance attached to integration policy approaches in the political debate, perhaps the most important result of our study is that after largely eliminating the influence of regional origin and the timing and type of migration through our design, and in addition controlling statistically for individual-level variables, as well as for the local size of the Turkish community, our regression results reveal only limited remaining cross-national differences. Turkish ethnic retention (identification and language use) did not differ significantly across the three countries. For the two measures of religious retention (identification and observance), and the four indicators of host culture adoption (identification, language proficiency and use, and interethnic contacts) we did find significant cross-national differences, but the weight of these differences in terms of explained variance was modest at best, in the order of 1–5 per cent of total variance.

While our conclusion must be that integration policies do not matter a great deal in terms of effect sizes, this is not to say that they do not matter at all, as for six of our dependent variables we did find significant cross-national differences. Even though we cannot exclude the possibility that these country differences are partly due to other country-level influences than integration policies – e.g. patterns of societal discrimination and prejudice – these cross-national differences allow us to pursue the question whether they fit the predictions of some theories on integration policy effects better than others.

For two of these theoretical perspectives our results are clear and negative. First, our evidence contradicts the reactive ethnicity thesis. If ethnic and religious retention would be a reaction to a lack of legal equality, we should have found the most retention in Germany, but what we find is the precise opposite: German Turks have similarly high levels of Turkish ethnic retention as their counterparts in France and the Netherlands, but they have the lowest levels of religious identification and observance. Levels of religious retention are highest in the Netherlands, the country that provides the highest degree of legal equality. One may argue that perhaps other mechanisms than legal equality produce reactive religiosity in the Netherlands and not in Germany. The political debate about Muslims in the Netherlands, which in recent years has become more negative due to the rise of right-wing populist parties, might be a candidate for such an alternative explanation. We do not consider this very plausible because much of what

the populist right in the Netherlands brings forward in the public debate – e.g. a ban on headscarves in the public service or a total ban on burqas – is mainstream policy in Germany and France, e.g. the southern German states where teachers are not allowed to wear a headscarf and nuns are, or France where there is full consensus among all parties that the public service should be free of headscarves and other religious symbols, and where the same full burqa ban that is considered an extreme position in the Netherlands is advocated by the President of the Republic and the ruling majority. In view of this, it is difficult to see why we should expect less reactive religiosity among Muslims in Germany and France than in the Netherlands.

Our results are similarly negative for the acculturative stress hypothesis, which claims that an emphasis on assimilation makes adoption of the host culture more difficult for immigrants. If this were true we should have found the most host culture adoption in the Netherlands, but with the exception of host country identification, we found the precise opposite. By contrast, France scored high on all four indicators of host culture adoption, in spite of the comparatively strong assimilation pressures and lack of facilitation of cultural pluralism. Again, an alternative explanation referring to the rise of the populist right in the Netherlands seems implausible in view of the fact that the demands of the Dutch populist right are to a large extent existing policy in France. Moreover, it is difficult to see why a few years in which Dutch populists have been electorally successful should negatively affect the Dutch language use and interethnic contacts of Dutch Turks, whereas almost three decades of similar right-wing populist success in France should have had no such effect. In addition, if acculturative stress is the reason for low levels of host culture adoption in the Netherlands, one would expect this to be especially visible in host country identification. On the contrary, Dutch Turks show comparatively high levels of identification with the host country, on a par with France and significantly higher than in Germany.

For the two other theoretical perspectives we found more – though in both cases not full – support. The results for host country identification are fully in line with the boundary permeability hypothesis, which claims that legal equality makes host culture adoption easier for immigrants. Host country identification is indeed significantly higher in France and the Netherlands than in Germany. However, the results regarding language proficiency and use, as well interethnic contacts, contradict the boundary permeability hypothesis to the extent that Dutch Turks do not display the expected high levels of linguistic and social assimilation.

The differences in levels of adoption between France and the Netherlands can be better accounted for by the material cost/benefit perspective, which argues that linguistic and social assimilation will occur more in countries that have made access to rights dependent on the fulfilment of assimilation requirements, to which the Netherlands has turned only in

recent years. The fact that German Turks also score low on all four indicators of host culture adoption does not, however, fit the material cost/benefit perspective.

A combination of the permeability and material cost/benefit perspectives would be able to account for the findings. In deriving predictions from the material cost/benefit hypothesis we have assumed that cultural assimilation pressures should have similar effects on host culture adoption in Germany and France. However, this obscures an important difference between German and French policies. Whereas French policies actively invite immigrants to become French citizens, German policies until well into the 1990s explicitly discouraged naturalisation and continued to be based on an ethnic rather than a civic idea of the nation. Thus, in the case of France, the stick of assimilation has been combined with the carrot of inclusive citizenship rights, but in the German context assimilation pressures may not have worked as incentives for immigrants to orient themselves towards the host society because German citizenship policies, at least until recently, never gave immigrants the idea that they could become fully equal German citizens, even if they did assimilate. Of course, the validity of such an interaction between assimilation requirements and otherwise inclusive citizenship rights needs to be tested in further research.

Our quasi-experimental research design is a major strength of this study, since it minimises cross-national composition effects, which previous comparative studies have not been able to control sufficiently. How important controlling for factors such as regional differences in the countries of emigration is, is illustrated by the fact that even within our relatively homogenous research group we found many significant differences between our two sub-regions. We also found important effects of belonging to the Alevite denomination of Islam. Our research shows that it is important to control for such regional and religious variation in the countries of origin, but cross-national quantitative research has thus far almost entirely neglected these factors. Because there are often strong correlations between particular sending regions within countries of origin and particular destination countries, the failure to take into account diversity within countries of origin may lead to biased conclusions in comparisons across immigration countries. We therefore believe that controlled comparative designs such as ours can fill an important gap between single-country case studies on the one hand, and broad, large-*N* studies, on the other.

However, such a design also has its limitations. To begin with, further research is necessary to determine whether our findings generalise to other groups than the Turks, and for other immigrant types than the former guest-workers and their direct offspring. Comparative research across immigrant groups suggests that Turkish immigrants have relatively strong community structures and high densities of ethnic organisations (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 1999). For other immigrant groups, retention and adoption are perhaps more malleable according to the integration policies of the receiving countries.

Another important limitation follows from our choice to eliminate composition effects as far as possible and therefore to exclude follow-up migrants from our sample. In doing so, we have excluded an area where integration policies may have important effects on socio-cultural integration. Levels of marriage migration in particular may be influenced by integration policies, both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, higher levels of retention and lower levels of adoption, such as those we found for the Netherlands, may lead to a higher inclination to seek marriage partners in the country of origin. Direct, easy access to naturalisation and low legal barriers to the import of marriage partners for aliens – as exist most in the Netherlands and France, and least in Germany – make transnational marriages less difficult and costly. Indeed, our data show that among the second generation the percentage of respondents who married a person living in Turkey is highest in the Netherlands (an estimated 61 per cent) and lowest in Germany (39 per cent).[13] An important next research question therefore seems to be an investigation of how integration policies affect marriage patterns and how these in turn may influence ethnic retention and host culture adoption in future generations.

As a final note, it is worth emphasising that we found a generally strong positive relation between socio-economic integration (labour market participation and education) and adoption and a negative relation between socio-economic integration and retention. The disadvantaged position of Turkish immigrants and their children on the labour market and in the education system (see e.g. Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath *et al*. 2008) that are in part the result of an 'ethnic penalty' (Heath *et al*. 2007) might explain the relatively low level of adoption that we found in all countries compared to levels of retention. However, it is likely that the causality also works in the opposite direction and that the low socio-economic position of Turks is also in part a consequence of lacking adoption and strong retention. A number of recent longitudinal studies have indeed shown that adoption of the host culture has a positive subsequent effect on labour market participation (Höhne and Koopmans 2010; Odé and Veenman 2003). At any rate, the fact that in our analysis the effects of socio-economic status variables tended to be much stronger than the differences across countries suggests that combating socio-economic disadvantages of immigrants is a more promising avenue to stimulate immigrants' socio-cultural integration than policies that focus on formal legal equality and cultural accommodation or assimilation.

Notes

1. See http://www.integrationindex.eu, http://emilie.eliamep.gr/, http://www.imiscoe.org/natac/ (accessed 30 October 2009).
2. See http://www.integrationindex.eu/ (accessed 30 October 2009).
3. See the yearly reports 'Multiculturele programmering' of the public broadcasting organisations, e.g. http://pics.portal.omroep.nl/upnos/ZakoiolHC_RAP_MC2004_21.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009).

4. South-central Anatolia consists of the provinces Afyon, Aksaray, Karaman, Kayseri, Konya, Nevşehir, and Niğde. East-central Anatolia encompasses Adiyaman, Amasya, Elaziğ, Malatya, Tokat, Tunceli and Sivas.
5. For more information on the sampling procedures and response rates see Ersanilli (2010).
6. For respondents without a partner or children, the scale was based on the average of the remaining items.
7. For male respondents without a partner, the scale excluded the headscarf question and was based on the average of the remaining items.
8. Since, except for religious observance that is based on z-scores, our dependent variables are categorical, we repeated the analyses with Ordered Logistic Regression. These analyses showed the same cross-national differences as OLS. The only exception is that the significance of the difference in interethnic social contacts between France and the Netherlands drops to the $p < 0.10$ level.
9. Age was not included as a control variable because of the consequent multicollinearity. However, we repeated all analyses with age and age^2 instead of the generation dummies. This led to minimally different results. The most notable difference is the loss of significance of the level of proficiency in the host country language between the Netherlands and France. Full tables are available on request.
10. For the adoption variables we also ran analyses using the share of the total immigrant population instead of the Turkish immigrant population, following the reasoning that adoption might be positively related to the population share of host country ethnics rather than the share of non-Turks. For social contacts the difference between the Netherlands and France then decreases to the $p < 0.10$ level. For the other variables the results do not change (tables available on request).
11. For religious identification the model improvement after adding the country dummies is significant at $p < 0.05$, for religious observance at $p < 0.001$.
12. For host country identification the model improvement after adding country dummies is significant at $p < 0.001$, for host country language proficiency marginally significant at $p < 0.10$, for host country language use at $p < 0.001$, and for social contacts at $p < 0.05$.
13. Estimates are based on all people who are married or living in common law. Partners are estimated to be marriage migrants when they were born in Turkey and came to the host country after the respondent turned 18.

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APPENDIX
DESCRIPTIVES OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES PER COUNTRY

	Netherlands		Germany		France	
	Mean	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Independent variables						
East-Central Anatolia	0.29	0.45	0.56	0.50	0.28	0.45
Alevi	0.06	0.23	0.17	0.38	0.05	0.22
First generation	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38	0.25	0.43
In-between generation	0.53	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.45	0.50
Second generation	0.30	0.46	0.29	0.45	0.30	0.46
Female	0.51	0.50	0.42	0.49	0.45	0.50
Married	0.77	0.42	0.78	0.42	0.82	0.39
No/primary education	0.24	0.43	0.20	0.40	0.31	0.46
Secondary education	0.59	0.49	0.68	0.47	0.58	0.49
Post-secondary education	0.17	0.38	0.12	0.33	0.11	0.31
Working	0.46	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.50	0.50
Phone book sample	0.57	0.50	0.60	0.49	0.63	0.48
Holiday sample	0.19	0.39	0.11	0.31	0.04	0.20
Snowball sample	0.24	0.43	0.29	0.46	0.32	0.47
Relative size of imm. population	17.91	8.70	13.72	4.63	13.37	6.30
Relative size of Turkish imm. pop.	2.63	1.24	2.89	1.51	1.31	1.20
Dependent variables						
Turkish identification	4.47	0.70	4.37	0.77	4.52	0.64
Turkish language proficiency	4.06	1.01	4.01	1.04	3.94	1.10
Muslim identification	4.59	0.70	4.32	0.86	4.49	0.74
Religious observance	0.15	0.70	−0.27	0.93	0.09	0.70
Host country identification	2.80	0.97	2.31	0.89	2.69	1.08
Host country language proficiency	3.79	1.16	3.90	1.05	3.84	1.25
Host country language use	0.32	0.30	0.35	0.30	0.41	0.35
Social contacts	1.59	0.54	1.57	0.53	1.69	0.60